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Although meeting the recommendations of corporate governance 
code is important, it is not sufficient to ensure the governance 
effectiveness (often having more form than substance). This, 
alongside with the fact that the Jordanian corporate governance 
code is still in its infancy, motivates the study to look beyond the 
current code recommendations. For this purpose, this study seeks 
views of key practitioners regarding possible additions/changes to 
the current code that they feel are important in promoting audit 
quality. Questionnaire survey is used to obtain views of the 
auditors, boards of directors and audit committees' members of 
the Jordanian listed companies. A number of important 
recommendations have been put forward by the respondents. The 
study has an implication for policymakers by providing useful 
inputs for future governance reform. Also, the study provides 
insights to companies that are interested in corporate governance 
quality. The important information gained from the key 
respondents no doubt contributes to the literature and also opens 
new avenues for future research. This study offers an important 
contribution by extending the investigation of boards of directors’ 
and audit committees’ roles in promoting audit quality to 
dimensions that are not recommended in the current governance 
code, and also widely neglected in the literature. 
 
Keywords: Board of Directors, Audit Committee, Audit Quality, 
Corporate Governance 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
A number of corporate governance codes across the 
globe have been enacted since the 1990s as a 
consequence of the corporate scandals, and also 
because of the substantial importance of corporate 
governance on corporate success and on overall 
economic health. In this vein, Jordan; over the last 
two decades has introduced a number of regulations 
to improve corporate governance and to enhance 
investors’ confidence, and ultimately to develop the 
financial market.  
The Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) has 
spent time and energy attempting to improve the 
roles of boards of directors and audit committees to 
ensure that investors obtain relevant and reliable 
information. The efforts of JSC in this vein are 
culminated in launching a Corporate Governance 
Code in 2008. This code put many responsibilities 
on the shoulders of boards of directors and audit 
committees as essential corporate governance 
pillars. The credibility of financial statements is a 
significant responsibility attached to the board of 
directors and audit committees1. So given that board 
of directors is responsible for controlling 
management behaviour and monitoring the overall 
financial system, and audit committee is directly 
responsible for overseeing financial reporting and 
auditing activities; it is expected from these two 
bodies to play a significant role in ensuring higher 
audit quality.  
However, adhering to the code 
recommendations does not necessarily ensure 
effectiveness i.e. companies may meet these 
recommendations as a tick box to meet the legal 
requirements or to mimic other companies (having 
more form over than substance). This is evidenced 
by many examples of companies that are collapsed 
despite their compliance with regulations.  
                                                          
1 Most of the recommendations of the Jordanian code of corporate governance 
focus on these two mechanisms (board of directors and audit committees). 
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This study, therefore, is interested in 
highlighting whether there are other corporate 
governance mechanisms (beyond the current code 
recommendations) that may boost boards of 
directors and audit committees’ effectiveness and, 
therefore, ensure high audit quality. For this 
purpose, views of auditors, members of boards of 
directors and audit committees have been obtained. 
The way that these groups think can affect the 
impact of the Jordanian governance code 
recommendations and may provide useful feedback 
for the regulatory bodies in particular when 
considering current corporate governance practices. 
A number of recommendations have been put 
forward by the respondents. The areas they most 
focused on, as important drivers to ensure audit 
quality, are audit committee tenure, internal control 
systems, non-audit services, board dynamics, audit 
committees’ skills, meetings’ agenda and length of 
meetings, and training scheme for new directors.  
The findings have implications for practice and 
research. As the corporate governance regulation in 
Jordan is still in its infancy, this study has an 
implication for policymakers by providing useful 
inputs for future governance reform. Also, this 
study provides insights to companies that are 
interested in the substance of corporate governance 
practices. Furthermore, the study offers an 
important contribution to the extant literature by 
extending the investigation of boards of directors’ 
and audit committees’ roles in promoting audit 
quality to dimensions that are not recommended in 
the current Jordanian governance code, and also 
widely neglected in the literature. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next 
part is about study motivation. The third part 
discusses the study background in terms of theory 
and literature. The methodology is clarified in part 
four. The discussion of the results and conclusion 
are presented in parts five and six, respectively. 
 
2. STUDY MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Since the 1990s, Jordan has successfully walked 
down the path towards a market economy. In 
particular, after launching the privatisation 
programme, the government has had a continuing 
interest in promoting effective corporate governance 
practices to regain investors’ confidence in the 
capital market and create a suitable investment 
environment to attract (and retain) external and 
local investors. Therefore, credible external auditing 
becomes essential to boost the investors’ confidence 
in the financial reporting. A lack of this confidence 
can adversely affect the financial market; given that 
investors are the main capital providers who 
support the economic system. 
This study is interested in the viewpoints of 
external auditors, members of boards of directors 
and audit committees with regards to possible 
improvements to the current governance 
regulations. These three groups are important in the 
corporate governance system, and they are in an 
ideal position to evaluate and comment on corporate 
governance practices. Boards of directors and audit 
committees are considered to be a cornerstone of 
corporate governance (Cohen et al., 2008; Cadbury, 
1992). Auditors also are considered to be an 
essential component in the corporate governance 
mosaic as they play an important role in mitigating 
agency conflict.  
A number of empirical studies identified 
different indicators of boards of directors’ and audit 
committees’ effectiveness not captured in regulation 
(Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2013; 
Gendron & Bédard, 2006)2. In other words, adoption 
of regulated best practice or code recommendations 
does not necessarily ensure boards of directors and 
audit committee effectiveness; so it is important to 
look beyond the regulated requirements. For 
example, though audit committee of Enron showed a 
high level of adhering to the regulations, the 
committee did not “probe the [external 
auditor]independence issue, nor did it initiate the 
type of communications with Andersen personnel 
that would have led to its discovering Andersen 
concerns with Enron accounting practices”. (US 
Senate, 2002: 57). 
Therefore, given that Jordanian corporate 
governance regulation is still evolving, and given 
that these targeted respondents have a consultative 
role in the formation of relevant regulations in 
Jordan; this motivates the study to look beyond the 
current governance recommendations to gain a 
complete understanding of the characteristics that 
determine boards of directors’ and audit 
committees’ effectiveness. This is by asking these 
relevant respondents regarding possible 
improvements or changes to the current code, i.e. 
board of directors and audit committee-related 
suggestions that they feel are important in 
promoting audit quality, apart from what is already 
recommended in the current governance code. The 
provided suggestions, in turn, could be a valuable 
input for any future governance reform. So, the 
research question is: 
RQ: What improvements to the current 
Jordanian governance code (regarding board and 
director and audit committee) would improve audit 
quality? 
Finally, it is worth to mention that the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) countries share a 
common culture, religion, language, tribal and family 
tradition and, to a large extent, colonial effect (Ali, 
1990). In this region, financial markets are still 
underdeveloped, and legal systems largely follow the 
civil-law tradition which is characterised by weak 
legal protection compared with the common-law. So, 
the results from the Jordanian environment can be – 
to a large extent- generalised to other MENA 
countries that share the same contextual 
characteristics.  
 
3. LITERATURE BACKGROUND 
 
3.1. Importance of audit quality 
 
External audit function plays a significant role in 
corporate governance system as it bridges a gap 
between those who prepare financial information 
(management) and those who use it (shareholders). It 
is considered as a key monitoring device because it 
enhances the quality of financial statements, 
safeguards the shareholders’ interests, and helps the 
investors for their investment decisions and by 
giving them confidence about company’s status 
(Cohen et al., 2002; Habbash, 2010; Brown et al., 
2011). 
Moreover, many researchers (Christensen, 
                                                          
2 These studies are not related directly to audit quality and also they are from 
different context (US and Canadian context). Cohen et al., (2013) considers 
the effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act from the view of boards of 
director, while Gendron and Bedard (2006) focuses on audit committee 
effectiveness in three large Canadian public corporations through direct 
observation. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2018 
 
10 
Glover, Omer & Shelley, 2016; Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2002; Piot, 2001) 
documented that the external audit function is an 
essential component in the corporate governance 
mosaic and it plays an important role in mitigating 
agency conflict and controls management’s 
opportunistic behaviour. Becker et al., (1998) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that auditors 
reduce information asymmetries and allow outsiders 
to verify the validity of financial statements. Thus, 
credible audit quality acts as an effective deterrent 
to financial statement fraud because management's 
reputation may be damaged and firm value 
adversely affected if misreporting is revealed. 
External auditing also has a vital role in 
mitigating the principal- principal conflict not only 
the conventional principal-agent conflict. For 
instance, In developing countries where the 
companies are characterised by concentration 
ownership which in turn increases the agency 
problem, the external audit function would create 
confidence and assurance that the interests of 
minority shareholders are sufficiently protected 
from exploitation by controlling shareholders (Fan & 
Wong, 2005).  
 
3.2. Role of board of directors and audit committee 
in audit quality 
 
The board of directors has received increasing 
attention by researchers in recent years due to its 
essential role in the corporate governance process. 
Board of directors is described as a lynchpin (Gillan, 
2006), and as a main central mechanism (Daily, 
Dalton & Cannella, 2003) for the organizations’ 
governance system. Board of directors has the 
ultimate responsibility for the functioning of the 
firm (Jensen, 1993) as their role includes a broad 
range of duties, powers, and responsibilities. 
Therefore, a high-quality board effectively 
achieves its monitoring, controlling, and advisory 
duties in order to maintain the company’s value and 
protect the shareholders’ interests. A number of 
prior studies presented its fruitful role in different 
corporate aspects. For instance, the effective board 
reduces probability of financial statements fraud 
(Beasley, 1996), reduces the likelihood of earning 
manipulation (Dechow, Sloan & Hutton, 1996), 
strengthens the internal control system (Dechow et 
al., 1996; Messier, 2000; Tsui, Jaggi & Gul, 2001), 
reduces opportunistic managerial behaviour and 
expropriation of firm resources (Byrd & Hickman, 
1992; Yatim, Kent & Clarkson, 2006), decreases cost 
of debt and increases the reporting integrity 
(Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 2004). 
Audit committees have assumed more 
importance since the 1990s, particularly after the 
enactment of relevant regulations such as Cadbury 
(1992), Higgs (2003) and Smith (2003) reports in the 
UK, SOX (2002) in the USA, and Best Practice Guide 
(1997) in Australia, which were a reaction to 
corporate failures and scandals. In Jordan, the 
corporate governance code also assigned many 
responsibilities to audit committees. All these 
regulations have emphasised the necessity of audit 
committee existence and its role in enhancing the 
financial reporting quality (Ghafran & O'Sullivan, 
2013; Turley & Zaman, 2004). 
Furthermore, audit committees are essential in 
strengthening the corporate governance system, and 
important for increasing financial reporting integrity 
and reducing audit risk (Turley and Zaman, 2004). 
To avoid a legal liability and to protect their 
reputation, audit committees should promote and 
maintain auditor independence, in addition to 
effectively monitoring the auditing process by 
demanding a broader audit scope (Alhababsah, 
2016; Zaman, Hudaib & Haniffa, 2011). Also, auditor 
independence is required in order to ensure audit 
quality, by mitigating management’s pressure on 
auditors (Firth, 1997). 
In order to mitigate the agency conflict, 
corporate governance framework is developed to 
control management behaviour, and compel it to 
behave consistently with shareholders’ interests. 
This can be achieved by preparing high-quality 
financial statements and reducing earning 
manipulation. External audit is one of the 
monitoring tools used by the directors to compel 
management to consider owners’ needs. Therefore, 
based on agency theory proposition, effective board 
of directors and audit committees play a dominant 
role in monitoring and controlling agents’ 
behaviours, and consequently decrease the agency 
cost by aligning the principal agents' interests 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976, and Fama & Jensen, 1983, 
Cohen et al., 2002).  
Furthermore, external audit complements/ 
supports board of directors monitoring role by 
controlling managers and increasing the 
current/prospective investors' confidence in the 
financial statements. This confirms that the 
theoretical legitimacy of audit function is reducing 
the agency cost as it reduces information asymmetry 
and therefore minimises the gap between owners 
and managers (Piot, 2001; Susanto, Pradipta & 
Djashan, 2017). 
On the other hand, Jeong and Rho (2004) 
argued that when the institutional setting does not 
demand or is less interested in audit quality, 
auditors likely evade providing credible audit 
quality, so they exert less effort to curb management 
misbehaviour as well as may behave 
opportunistically to retain/attract more clients. So, 
in Jordan, the litigation risk concern is weak 
compared to developed contexts; and this decreases 
auditor’ incentives to perform high audit quality. 
Investors in Jordan do not normally complain 
against auditors, and there are no common lawsuits 
cases against auditors (Jordan Association of 
Certified Public Accountants, 2015). This, 
consequently, increases the importance of effective 
boards of directors and audit committees to ensure 
that the auditors are delivering high-quality audit. 
 
3.3. Perceived role of board of directors and audit 
committee: empirical evidence  
 
Several attempts have been made by the previous 
studies to examine the correlation between 
characteristics of boards of directors and audit 
committees, and audit quality. What is known about 
the role played by these corporate governance pillars 
is largely based on empirical studies that employ 
secondary data. In other words, the literature 
focuses particularly on board of directors and audit 
committee composition and experience. So, given 
the importance of survey studies to refine our 
understanding of this matter, it is important to 
consider views of the key corporate governance 
practitioners. 
 However, a limited number of previous studies 
used surveys to address some of boards of directors 
and audit committees’ characteristics/activities that 
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have been highlighted by recent governance 
regulation and are difficult to be captured through 
the secondary data studies (Contessotto & Moroney, 
2014, DeZoort, 1997; Kamel & Elkhatib, 2013; 
Goodwin & Seow, 2000).   
Contessotto and Moroney (2014) examined 
opinions of Australian auditors by asking them to 
identify the characteristics they use when assessing 
audit committee effectiveness. They found that 
external auditors rely more on a number 
characteristics that are not recommended in the 
Australian corporate governance code. This indicates 
that the governance code no doubt misses important 
recommendations which are important to enhance 
corporate governance effectiveness.   
Eighty-two percent of the 253 US audit 
committee members believed that audit quality had 
improved after SOX, as per a survey carried out by 
the Centre for Audit Quality (2008). Based on the 
perceptions of audit committees’ members, the 
improvement to audit quality is attributed to the 
level of communication with auditors, the increased 
oversight role of audit committees, and the 
increased emphasis on auditors’ quality. 
Moreover, Goodwin and Seow (2000) explored 
the perceptions of directors, investors and auditors 
in order to identify their opinions about corporate 
governance effectiveness (e. g. board structure). In 
this survey, the Singaporean respondents have been 
asked to indicate the optimal number of 
independent directors, the optimal board size to 
ensure effective corporate governance, and whether 
they support chairman-CEO separation. The results 
showed that 36% of the respondents considered that 
the majority of board members should be 
independent and they also supported the separation 
of the position of CEO and chairman. The result 
highlights the importance of board independence 
and separation of chairman position from CEO 
position. 
DeZoort (1997) examined audit committee 
perceptions regarding their oversight role within 
firms. The findings show that many US audit 
committee members believe they do not have the 
required oversight expertise related to accounting 
and auditing, and they have agreed about the 
importance of holding sufficient expertise in these 
oversight areas. The results also indicate that audit 
committee members perform different roles beyond 
what is listed in the proxy statement and therefore 
agreed to expand their oversight responsibilities. 
Furthermore, this study shows that audit 
committees place more weight on internal control 
evaluation and perceive this as one of the most 
important areas of their oversight. This is in line 
with the importance placed by different legislations 
on the role of the audit committee in evaluating and 
monitoring internal control systems. 
Cohen et al. (2002) pointed out that auditors 
perceived audit committees to be lacking in 
effectiveness and power, and their role in 
communicating with the auditors was usually 
passive. Instead, they perceived that boards of 
directors play a more active role. However, Stewart 
and Munro (2007) argued that these findings may 
not hold at the current time as audit committees get 
more attention and many related regulations are 
enacted, so further research is therefore needed. 
Opinions of audit committee chairs, financial 
officers and audit partners were surveyed by Beattie 
et al. (2013) to explore what regulatory and 
economic variables contribute to audit quality. The 
three groups of respondents rated various audit 
committee interactions with auditors among the 
factors most enhancing audit quality. Overall, 
perceptions of all respondents stress the role of the 
audit committee in ensuring audit quality. Though 
the perceptions of the different groups are 
consistent to some extent, there are some different 
opinions attributable to their different roles and 
responsibilities.  
Evidence from developing markets came from 
Kamel and Elkhatib (2013) who employed a 
questionnaire survey to examine the respondents’ 
perceptions (external auditors and financial 
managers or senior accountants) with respect to the 
role of audit committees in Egypt and their potential 
effect on financial reporting quality. The findings 
indicate that “reviewing significant changes in 
accounting policies” is the most important task for 
an effective audit committee, followed by internal 
control evaluation. The results also show that the 
vast majority of respondents have rated the 
independence of audit committee members and 
their financial experience as the most important 
attributes that should be considered when selecting 
the members of an audit committee. Finally, the 
study reported that the existence of a well- 
functioning audit committee is perceived as an 
effective corporate governance mechanism in 
restricting the incidence of financial statement fraud 
in Egypt. 
Finally, it can be concluded that the literature 
suffers from a paucity of survey studies in this 
regard. The main focus of the literature is on the 
studies that employ secondary data and focus on 
common quantifiable (measurable) characteristics 
(which are recommended in the code e.g. 
independence, experience, size, meetings) to 
examine board of directors and audit committee 
effectiveness. Even in the survey studies mentioned 
above, the respondents have been asked about the 
effectiveness of the board and audit committee 
characteristics which are already 
available/recommended in the regulations. This 
study will look beyond the current 
recommendations of the Jordanian governance code 
in order to find other attributes that can enhance 
boards of directors and audit committees’ 
effectiveness and, therefore, ensure high audit 
quality. 
  
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Research approach 
 
The extent to which researchers are clear about the 
theory when they start their research raises an 
important question concerning the design of the 
research (Saunders, 2011). This question is whether 
the research is deductive or inductive. The deductive 
approach means that the researcher develops 
hypotheses based on a specific theory and employs 
an appropriate methodology to examine the 
hypotheses (Saunders, 2011). 
In the inductive approach, the researcher 
collects data (usually through interviews, open 
questionnaires) and reach a conclusion as a result of 
data analysis i.e. a researcher observe 
phenomena/obtain feedback and based on data 
analysis induces general inferences or theory (e.g. 
grounded theory) (Saunders, 2011, Sekaran & Bougie, 
2016). Studies using this approach are likely to be 
more interested in the context in which such events 
are taking place more than the sample size as the 
main concern is specific rather than general 
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(Saunders, 2011).  
In the same vein, much of research in 
accounting is considered either positive research 
(the research which explains and predicts particular 
events) or normative research (the research which 
prescribes particular actions or activities). Positive 
(descriptive) theory starts with the assumption(s) 
and, through logical deduction, enables some 
prediction(s) to be made about the way things will be 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1978).  
Deegan and Unerman (2011) stated that while 
positive accounting theory typically based on 
observation, normative theory based on what the 
researcher believes should happen in a particular 
event. In other words, while positive theory seeks to 
analyse the observation and data at hand, and then 
derive a conclusion accordingly, normative theory 
seeks to describe what should be done in the future 
(provides a basis for predicting future actions). 
Therefore, this study considers the perceptions 
obtained from the respondents in order to reach 
useful inferences in the Jordanian context. 
Consequently, the study offers (prescribes) number 
of recommendations for policymakers in particulars 
regarding corporate governance mechanisms under 
investigations i.e. this study offers information 
about the expected implication of particular actions 
for interested parties This, therefore, indicates that 
the study uses the inductive approach and the 
results can be explained using the normative theory 
framework. 
 
4.2. Participants 
 
As mentioned earlier, the participants are divided 
into three groups: members of boards of directors, 
members of audit committees and external auditors. 
Since these groups are a cornerstone of monitoring 
mechanisms and have a consultative role in the 
formation of relevant regulations in Jordan; their 
perceptions could have remarkable implications for 
the purpose of the current research. 
Boards of directors and audit committees are 
considered to be a cornerstone of corporate 
governance (Cadbury, 1992; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy 
& Wright, 2008). The role of these two governance 
pillars is a central part of the Jordanian Code of 
Corporate Governance (2008) as monitoring 
mechanisms to ensure high audit quality which 
helps in protecting shareholders’ interests. The 
boards of directors are responsible for the integrity 
of overall financial reporting systems, and in 
particular, they are responsible for presenting 
reliable financial statements.  
The audit committee is the main board sub-
committee which has particular oversight 
responsibility in relation to the financial statements. 
It is responsible for ensuring auditor independence 
and reviewing internal control system, engaging in 
the process of appointment of the external auditors, 
assessing the external auditor's plan of work, 
reviewing financial reports, and discussing matters 
related to the audit.  
Moreover, as external auditors ensure 
compliance with IFRS, provide a fair assurance about 
firms’ financial positions, and play an important role 
in mitigating agency conflict; they are considered to 
be an essential component in the corporate 
governance mosaic (Cohen et al., 2002; Nurunnabi, 
2017; Piot, 2001). 
 
4.3. Survey instrument and sampling 
 
A Self-administered questionnaire is utilised in this 
study (see Appendix). This type of questionnaire is 
completed by the respondents, and it is 
administered electronically using web-based survey. 
Qualtrics software has been used, which is one of 
the most effective ways to send and follow up 
questionnaires and see the responses instantly. A 
covering letter is added to the questionnaire 
explaining the nature and purpose of the study. In 
order to encourage respondents to cooperate with 
the researcher and provide truthful information, a 
clear statement is added to the covering letter 
indicating the confidentiality of responses and the 
anonymity of respondents. 
The survey included auditors and members of 
boards of directors and audit committees for 160 
listed non-financial firms (as in 31/12/2015). As per 
the data obtained from Jordan Securities 
Commission (JSC) and Amman Stock Exchange (ASX), 
the average board size is eight members and the 
average of the audit committee is 3 members. So 
total boards of directors’ members will be 1280 and 
audit committees’ members will be 480. As the audit 
committee members at the same time are directors, 
the 1280 members have been split into directors 
who are members of audit committees and directors 
who are not. As a result, the population of directors 
who are not members of audit committees is 800 
(1280-480) as presented in Table 1 below.  
Nearly all the listed non-financial firms in 
Jordan (96%) are audited by ten audit firms. Based 
on the information obtained from the Jordan 
Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA), 
the average certified auditors in these firms is five 
auditors. So, the targeted population for external 
auditors is 50. The study considered all of the 
population because it is recommended to take all the 
population if its size is lower than 50 cases (Henry, 
1990). 
The study employed a random sampling 
method in order to choose the target sample size. 
So, a list of all directors has been prepared and 260 
directors and 214 audit committee members have 
been randomly selected. After that, a directory for 
the sample is prepared which contains a list of their 
details, e.g. firms they work in and contact details. 
The contact details are obtained from various 
sources e.g. the Amman Stock Exchange, the 
Securities Depository Centre, websites, and personal 
relations.  
 
Table 1. Structure of population and study sample 
 
Groups 
Population 
(N) 
Sample size (n) 
(95% confidence level and 
p=.05 is assumed) 
Returned 
questionnaires 
Response 
rate 
Overall 
response rate 
Directors in boards (not 
members of audit committee) 
800 260 78 30% 
32% 
Audit committee members 480 214 68 32% 
External auditors 50 50 23 46% 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics of respondents’ 
information 
 
This section presents descriptive statistics for the 
three groups of respondents based on their 
positions i.e. directors (who are not a member of 
audit committees), audit committee members and 
external auditors as summarised in Table 2. In terms 
of length of work experience, the figures in Panel A 
(Table 2) show that about half of respondents 
(47.2%) have more than 8 years and up to 12 years 
work experience in their position, and 20.1% of them 
have more than 12 years of experience; 25% of 
respondents have between 4 years and 8 years of 
experience and, finally, respondents who have held 
their positions for 4 years or less represent 8.5%. 
These results are consistent with expectations, as 
these groups usually retain their positions for a long 
period of time in Jordan. 
As indicated in Panel B, about one-third of the 
respondents hold postgraduate qualifications, a 
majority of them hold a first degree (64.8%), and 
only 6% have lower than degree qualifications. Panel 
C shows the composition of respondents in terms of 
their gender. It can be noted that women’s 
participation in such positions is still limited (5.5%) 
compared with other developed countries and this is 
expected as women in Jordan are still 
underrepresented in the workforce and in the 
business community in particular. 
In conclusion, a majority of the respondents 
are well educated as they have higher academic 
qualifications and also they have significant work 
experience. This consequently suggests that they are 
aware of the issues raised in the questionnaire, and 
also leads us to expect that their perceptions should 
be rational and therefore more credible findings. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the three groups of respondents 
 
Panel A: Experience 
Length of experience (years) Board of directors (%) Audit committee (%) External auditors (%) Total (%) 
4 or less 10.3 7.6 6.1 8.5 
More than 4, up to 8 18.4 36.7 9.1 24.1 
More than 8, up to 12 47.4 48.1 45.5 47.2 
More than 12 24.2 7.6 39.4 20.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Panel B: Qualification 
Qualification Board of directors (%) Audit committee (%) External auditors (%) Total (%) 
Postgraduate 42.5 19 18.2 29.1 
Bachelor 51.8 72.2 81.8 64.8 
Others 5.7 8.9 0 6 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Panel C: Gender 
Gender Board of directors Audit committee External auditors Total 
Male 94.3 98.7 84.8 94.5 
Female 5.7 1.3 15.2 5.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
5.2. The results: suggested improvement to the 
current governance regulation in Jordan 
 
A number of recommendations have been put 
forward by the member of boards of directors, audit 
committees and external auditors. The areas they 
most focused on, as important drivers to ensure 
audit quality, are audit committee tenure, internal 
control systems, non-audit services, board dynamics, 
audit committees’ skills, meetings’ agenda and 
length of meetings, and training scheme for new 
directors (see Table 3 below). 
 
5.3. Discussion of the responses  
 
This section discusses the comments that have been 
mentioned by the three groups of respondents 
regarding the matter under investigation. The 
discussion particularly focuses on the 
comments/suggestions that are highlighted by more 
than one respondent or the suggestions that are 
more relevant to the purpose of this study. 
Importantly, in order to add more sense to the 
mentioned comments, this study endeavoured to 
support the respondents’ suggestions by evidence 
from previous high profile studies. 
As a result, the respondents made different 
recommendations. Particularly with regards to audit 
committee tenure, gender diversity in the board of 
directors, internal control systems, non-audit 
services, board dynamics, training and length of 
meetings. 
Based on the Jordanian governance framework, 
it is not allowed for the external auditors to carry 
out most of the non-audit services at the same time 
while they provide statutory audit work. 
Accordingly, auditors are not allowed to offer 
contemporaneously services; such as bookkeeping 
service, liquidation consultations’ service, or design 
internal control system.  
 Loosening (relaxing) the regulations about non-
audit services is one of the important suggestions 
made by auditors for consideration in any future 
amendments to the corporate governance code. They 
believe that providing non-audit service 
contemporaneously with the statutory audit service 
doesn’t affect auditors’ independence. Rather, it 
increases their business knowledge and thus 
contributes positively to the audit process and audit 
quality. 
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Table 3. The main and relevant comments suggested by the respondents 
 
“I do not believe that providing non-audit services in addition to the statutory audit for the same client actually affects auditor 
independence. Instead, it gives us (the auditors) more knowledge about the nature of clients’ businesses and thus contributes 
positively to the audit process and audit quality. So, we are looking for the relevant regulatory bodies to take this into 
consideration”. 
I would prefer if the regulation related to non-audit services is changed because I do not believe in the alleged tie between 
providing consultations to a client and auditor independence. I believe that there is no tie whatsoever [between providing non-
audit service and auditor independence]. 
“The important point in my mind to ensure the effectiveness of directors of audit committees is stating a maximum limit of 
years for their service within the same committee, because in Jordan they have long tenure and I have a concern whether those 
directors after a long period still have independence and still conduct effective monitoring procedures. They may behave in 
favour of management and against the auditors and this no doubt affects audit quality”. 
As women are more sensitive to reputation loss and more risk-averse than men especially in a conservative community like 
Jordan, the existence of female in a board of directors is likely will strengthen the board and encourage it to demand additional 
audit effort from auditors to protect directors’ reputations and to avoid legal responsibility”. 
“Team diversity, including male and female in the same team, is likely associated with higher levels of discussion, different 
opinions and, therefore, increases team productivity”. 
“Given that the current code [Corporate Governance Code, 2008] focuses on financial experience only, this might negatively 
affect the diversified abilities of audit committees’ members. Including members who have different types of experience could  
greatly improve skills of the committee [audit committee]”. 
“I would say that a combination of financial, legal, and business operation experience will build a strong and effective comm ittee 
and thus definitely leave an impact on audit quality”. 
“When talking about board meetings throughout a year, I would say that meeting duration should be taken into account not just 
the number of meetings”. 
“From my point view, the nature and dynamics of the discussions in board meetings are extremely important. So, attention 
should be on what’s going on inside the boardroom rather than focusing on formalism e.g. board size and frequency of 
meetings”. 
“The big challenge for directors is the extent to which they are up to date with a company’s business operations. I suggest that 
policymakers set instructions to ensure that directors are under a continuous improvement system so that they are not keeping 
on leading the company by the old mind/school standards. This, therefore, will create a more effective board of directors and no 
doubt will contribute to the quality of financial information”. 
“Fresh directors who join the board do not know much about the company and its business nature, and this adversely affects 
their effectiveness. So, I would suggest that the governance regulation includes requirements to force companies to run 
supportive training programmes about, for example, a company’s operations, the legal requirements and relevant legislation”.  
“The board of directors is seen as a teamwork, so if this team is not competent in communication and interaction skills, this will 
lead to a weak board and, therefore, it will fail to carry out its monitoring role effectively. Such skills should be taken into 
consideration for board members”. 
“Following up internal audit reports by the audit committee should be taken seriously and there should be a strict rule for this 
given the importance of these reports. Although the audit committee is responsible for internal audit and control, it does not 
prepare and review internal control reports appropriately or does not do this function at all”. 
 
There is evidence from the previous empirical 
studies supporting this idea and reporting a so-
called knowledge spillover advantage through 
providing non-audit services. Antle, Gordon, 
Narayanamoorthy, and Zhou (2006), Arruñada (1999) 
and Simunic (1984) argued that the knowledge 
spillover happens because the same set of 
information is used in achieving those type of 
services, and the results in one service have a 
favourable effect on the other. For instance, an 
auditor who evaluates the internal control system, as 
part of his usual duty, has a better knowledge with 
which to advise on or improve the internal control 
system than another service provider. Also, other 
previous studies reported no relationship between 
providing non-audit services and auditor 
independence, and therefore no effect on audit 
quality (Firth, 2002; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy 
& Raghunandan, 2003). However, the above points 
mentioned by auditors should be considered 
carefully, as auditors may work toward maximising 
their financial benefit by relaxing this particular 
requirement. 
In addition, the literature reported what so-
called “contractual nature advantage” as another 
favourable impact of providing non-audit services 
contemporaneously with the statutory audit service 
(Arruñada, 1999). The contractual nature advantage 
“is connected with the fact that the exchange of 
professional services involves high transaction costs 
due to the informational asymmetry existing 
between the supplier of and client for such services. 
Therefore, it becomes worthwhile to make use of the 
safeguards (brand name, reputation, conduct rules, 
control systems among professionals, and client 
confidence) already developed when contracting and 
ensuring quality in auditing, thereby reducing the 
total cost of providing such services (Arruñada, 
1999: 514).  
On the other hand, audit committee tenure 
increases members’ experience of the company’s 
operations and therefore may help them in 
developing their monitoring competencies (Gendron 
& Bédard, 2010). However, respondents from the 
auditor group stated that long tenure for an audit 
committee member might affect his/her 
independence as this could create a close 
relationship with management.  
This response supports an argument in the 
literature which indicates that directors’ tenure 
could compromise their independence and thus 
make them less critical of the management (Vafeas, 
2001, 2003). This, therefore, diminishes the quality 
of their monitoring of management and the 
reporting integrity. Vafeas (2003: 1045) proposed a 
management friendliness argument “suggesting that 
seasoned directors are more likely to be a friend, 
and less likely to monitor, managers. In time, 
directors may be co-opted by management as 
directors become less mobile and less employable”. 
In this vein, it is worth noting that some regulations 
around the world take into account the potential 
adverse effects of long tenure for directors and 
therefore state a maximum limit for their service, 
e.g. the UK Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (Smith, 2003) limits audit committee 
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appointments to a maximum of nine years.  
Gender diversity is also one of the important 
recommendations that the respondents focused on. 
A number of respondents suggest that existence of 
female in the board of directors increases board 
effectiveness. A response from directors highlighted 
the importance of gender diversity from a 
behavioural perspective. The respondent stresses 
the benefits of team diversity which leads to higher 
levels of discussion, different opinions within the 
team and, therefore, increases team productivity.  
Also, a member of an audit committee 
mentioned that women in the board strengthen the 
board and encourage it to demand additional audit 
effort from auditors to protect directors’ reputations 
and to avoid legal responsibility. The respondent 
added, this is because, women are more sensitive to 
reputation loss and more risk-averse than men 
especially in a conservative community like Jordan. 
This response is supported by different 
evidence from literature which has shown 
considerable evidence for the importance of gender 
diversity for many aspects in organizations (Efferin 
et al., 2016; Gul, Srinidhi & Ng, 2011). For instance, 
existence of women in boards of directors improves 
the monitoring process, leads to a more effective 
board, strengthens corporate governance system 
and improves disclosure quality (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009; Nielsen & Huse, 2010; Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 
2009), improve earning quality (Gul et al., 2011), and 
reduce conflict level (Nielsen & Huse, 2010). 
Moreover, women are generally considered more 
risk-averse than men, and their decisions tend to be 
more conservative (Watson & McNaughton, 2007).  
Due to the importance of gender diversity on 
the board, many countries take it into consideration. 
Some countries have determined a minimum 
number of directors’ seats that should be allocated 
for females. For example, Sweden has proposed a 
legal requirement that 25% of board’s seats should 
be allocated to female directors, Norway requires 
40% of the board to be female (Gul et al., 2011). Also, 
in its 2010 edition, the UK Corporate Governance 
Code recommends giving due regard to diversity, 
including gender diversity, when searching for board 
candidates and making appointments to the board. 
The Jordanian regulations do not yet regulate gender 
diversity in boards of directors. 
A couple of comments have been added by 
directors regarding the importance of different skills 
and experiences in audit committees, and the focus 
should not be on financial expertise only. One of the 
directors is concerned that the emphasis on 
financial experience is at the expense of other 
important experiences.  
In this vein, Krishnan et al. (2011) reported that 
a legal background for audit committee members 
makes them more vigilant about legal risks that are 
associated with inadequate, inaccurate or aggressive 
financial reporting, and therefore can help in 
ensuring audit quality. Furthermore, such members 
can provide a fruitful support in some accounting 
transactions that have legal implications, e.g., 
mergers and acquisitions. Also, business and 
operation expertise (i.e. firm-specific knowledge) 
could help audit committee members in fostering 
their monitoring competencies. This, therefore, 
makes the directors more effective in overseeing the 
firm’s financial reporting process (Gendron & 
Bédard, 2010). As current regulations pay much 
attention to financial expertise, these responses may 
have implications for future governance reform i.e. 
take into consideration a balanced portfolio of skills 
on the audit committee. 
Furthermore, diligence is important in 
indicating board effectiveness, and this has been 
captured through the literature using frequency of 
meetings as an indication of diligence. However, one 
of the directors mentioned that it is worth looking at 
the duration of board meetings not only the number 
of meetings per year. Another director also provided 
insight into the importance of the value and depth 
of the discussions inside the board. 
Directors’ business knowledge also gained 
attention from respondents as a way of boosting 
their oversight effectiveness. A director pointed out 
that directors should not keep leading the company 
through the old mind. They should be up to date 
with a company’s business operations and he 
suggested that policymakers should set instructions 
for continuous professional development (and 
supportive training programmes for new directors) 
in order to enhance directors’ effectiveness. 
Other competencies, such as the ability to work 
in small groups, negotiate and communicate 
effectively, have obtained recognition from 
respondents as important skills. In this vein, a 
director mentioned that board of directors is seen as 
a teamwork, which increases the need for this 
teamwork to be competent in communication and 
interaction skills. This will create a strong board 
and, therefore, it will carry out its monitoring role 
effectively.  
The audit committees in Jordan are expected to 
play an important role in evaluating and supervising 
the internal control procedures to ensure its 
effectiveness. Therefore, effective internal control 
helps in preventing reporting failure and 
management cheating and, in turn, helps the 
external auditing process (JCGC "Jordanian 
Corporate Governance Code", 2008; Lee, Mande & 
Ortman, 2004; Turley & Zaman, 2004; Zgarni, Hlioui 
& Zehri, 2016). Effective monitoring and reviewing of 
the internal control system by audit committees 
enhances their understanding of the firm’s 
operations and increases the chance of discovering 
misstatements. So, although JCGC (2008) highlighted 
the importance of internal control and added it to 
audit committees’ agendas, some directors pointed 
out that the internal control report is not 
appropriately prepared and sometimes is not 
prepared at all.  
In summary, the perceptual viewpoints of the 
respondents clustered around the following themes; 
the importance of gender diversity in boards of 
directors, setting a limit for audit committee tenure, 
internal control system, non-audit services, board 
dynamics, audit committees’ skills, meetings’ agenda 
and length of meetings, and training scheme for new 
directors. 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND POTENTIAL RESEARCH 
AVENUES 
 
This study seeks views of auditors, members of 
boards of directors and audit committees in order to 
know whether there are other corporate governance 
mechanisms (apart from what are already mentioned 
in the current code) which may enhance audit 
quality. The study, in particular, focuses on boards 
of directors and audit committees are main 
corporate governance pillars as highlighted in the 
corporate governance code.  
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A number of recommendations have been put 
forward by the respondents. The suggested 
recommendations clustered around the following 
themes; the importance of gender diversity in 
boards of directors, setting a limit for audit 
committee tenure, internal control system, non-audit 
services, board dynamics, audit committees’ skills, 
meetings’ agenda and length of meetings, and 
training scheme for new directors.  
It is hoped this study will offer useful feedback 
for the regulatory bodies to consider regarding the 
current corporate governance legislation, regarding 
future governance reform and also enabling other 
interested parties to gain a better understanding of 
the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and audit quality. For example, the 
regulatory bodies may seek a balanced portfolio of 
skills within the audit committees, consider gender 
diversity, audit committee tenure...etc. This feedback 
can also be applied to other similar developing 
markets, and in particular MENA countries that 
share similar economic, political, social and cultural 
environment to those in Jordan. 
This study also offers an important 
contribution to the literature by extending the 
investigation of boards of directors’ and audit 
committees’ roles in promoting audit quality to 
dimensions that are not recommended in the 
current Jordanian governance code. Hence, this 
study opens new avenues for future research which 
will help in supporting the suggested 
recommendations in this study. For instance, future 
research is needed to focus on the length of 
meetings, not just number of meetings, the nature 
and tone of board discussions and on other 
competencies and professional skills, including the 
ability to work, negotiate and communicate 
effectively in small groups. In addition, directors 
should play an effective role, not merely voting on 
or approving what they receive from management, 
i.e. how a board effectively formulates actions and 
behaves in meetings is very important. So a good 
research opportunity could be by going into the 
boardroom and studying directors’ behaviour and 
their interactions, which will, therefore, provide a 
deep insight into directors’ interactions during 
meetings. 
Moreover, the result concerning audit 
committee experience also raised a motivation for 
future research to address other experiences that 
the members should hold such as legal expertise 
and business operation. The existence of legal 
experts on an audit committee, for instance, makes 
them more interested in avoiding litigation that 
could arise from fraudulent financial reporting, i.e. 
more vigilant to avoid the legal liability threat. 
Future studies can also empirically examine other 
mentioned dimensions e.g. does gender diversity in 
the board of directors affect audit quality? 
Finally, this study is carried out in the 
Jordanian context so the findings could be 
considered with caution by other markets that 
characterised by different contextual factors e.g. 
different culture, regulatory framework…etc. In this 
vein, future research can cover a comparative study 
of Jordan with other developed or developing 
countries to highlight the impact of different 
institutional settings, and increase generalisability. 
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Appendix: Questionnaire 
 
Thank you again for your acceptance to take part in this survey 
This questionnaire has been designed to elicit your perceptions about the Corporate Governance 
recommendations (2008), particularly board of directors and audit committee features and their effect on 
audit quality, i.e. It includes two main open-ended questions seeking your view regarding any 
recommendations (related to board of directors and audit committees) you think are important in improving 
audit quality, apart from what are already recommended in the current code. 
All responses will be confidential and will not be shared with anyone. Your responses will be treated 
anonymously and any responses will only be considered in aggregate form along with the responses of all 
other survey respondents. 
 
Your responses are highly appreciated. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
Dr. Salem Alhababsah 
 
 
Part one: General information 
 
Position: 
 
o Director in the board (but NOT member in the audit committee)  
o Member in the audit committee  
o External auditor 
 
Gender: 
 
o Male  
o Female 
 
Experience: 
 
o Less than 4 years  
o 4-8 years 
o More than 8 years and less than 12 years 
o More than 12 years 
 
Qualification: 
 
o Postgraduate 
o Undergraduate 
o Other 
 
- In your opinion, what are improvements you suggest to the current board of directors-related 
regulation would most improve audit quality? 
 
 
 
 
 
- In your opinion, what are improvements you suggest to the current audit committee-related regulation 
would most improve audit quality? 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
